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The Aesthetic Factor in Zoning
Ever since its ephemeral appearance at the turn of the century,
aesthetics has played a vaguely peculiar, yet erratically prominent role
in zoning jurisprudence. Because of its deceptively chameleonic nature'
and the often uncertain status accorded it in zoning conflicts, the pre-
cise importance which aesthetics has contributed to the law of zoning
becomes difficult to analyze until pinpointed by retrospective analysis
which helps to illustrate the strategic placement of this quixotic con-
cept within a definitive trend of zoning cases.2
When aesthetics has been either the underlying consideration or a
motivating point of interest in legislative zoning enactments, it has not
been properly acknowledged by the courts. When courts have had the
opportunity to utilize the aesthetic factor and conceptually clarify its
basic essence, they have often avoided the real aesthetic issue by re-
sourcefully providing an expedient alternative to justify the exercise
of the police power and to substantiate the result achieved. Conse-
quently, courts have conveniently furnished a genesis of conflicting
attitudes which reveal an artfully manipulative sophistry and subtly
cavalier indifference that have combined to further obscure the im-
portance of the aesthetic factor in zoning dilemmas.
It is the purpose of this comment (1) to explain the differentiated
status which aesthetics has occupied in various zoning trends; (2) to
review the germination of aesthetics in New York zoning problems
with an emphasis on certain major cases; (3) to assess aesthetics in
Pennsylvania decisions; and (4) to suggest what forseeable routes the
courts will pursue in future zoning litigation which deals with sub-
stantial aesthetic considerations.
1. Courts have achieved minimal success in providing lucid definitions of the term
"aesthetics." One court stated: "Just what is meant by the use of the term aesthetic is not
entirely clear; but apparently it is intended to designate thereby matters which are evident
to sight only, as distinguished from those discerned through smell or hearing." Sundeen
v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253, 258, 141 A. 142, 144 (1928). Certain writers have provided good
approximations of the term: Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,
20 LAW & CONTEMPT. PROB. 218, 218-19 n.2 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier]; Norton,
Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 171, 171-72 (1967).
2. There is a wealth of articles which have examined different aesthetic zoning trends.
Two of the most accomplished pieces of writing in this area are Rodda, The Accomplish-
ment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL. L. REv. 149 (1954) [herein-
after cited as Rodda], and Dukeminier, supra note 1. See also Agnor, Beauty Begins a
Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning, 11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962) [hereinafter cited





A discussion of any aspect of zoning must initially address itself to
the concept of the police power.3 It has become commonplace to state
that the police power can constitutionally limit or restrict the use of
property for valid societal interests. 4 Such power, however, must serve
at least one of four established purposes: the promotion of public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.5 While the first three objec-
tives are relatively lucid in their definitional aspects and have furnished
the courts with little difficulty in their being sustained as a basis for
the exercise of the police power, the fourth purpose-general welfare-
has plagued the courts with an inability to establish the proper limita-
tions by which such a phrase might be measured.6 As a result, the prob-
lem has emerged: to what extent should the term "general welfare,"
which is often used interchangeably with "public welfare," be expanded
to include considerations such as aesthetics, a concept which has not
been traditionally acknowledged as a justification for the employment
of the police power? The problem was excellently pinpointed by one
court in 1925:
"Public welfare" and similar phrases are comprehensive expres-
sions. Within them are undoubtedly embraced the health, peace,
morals and safety of the community. What beyond these features
of social welfare the general phrase in its relation to the police
3. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), stated:
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. . . . It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare." Id. at 111. In the highly influential case, City of Aurora
v. Burns, 319 I11. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925), the Supreme Court' of Illinois stated: "With the
growth and development of the state the police power necessarily develops, within reason-
able bounds, to meet the changing conditions. . . . The power is not circumscribed by
precedents arising out of past conditions, but is elastic and capable of expansion in order to
keep pace with human progress." Id. at 93, 149 N.E. at 788.
4. Such theory poses the oft-stated question: when does a regulation become a taking?
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922); see Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). In the area of zoning legislation, the recurring
problem is precisely to what extent may the state, under the aegis of the police power,
regulate-for aesthetic purposes-the use of private property?
5. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6. In Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 129 A. 512 (Ch. 1925), the court, in analyzing
the expansive characteristics of a phrase such as "public welfare," stated:
It is rather in the recognition that the phrase is in danger of carrying too much with
it and needs to be somewhat confined. Whatever the expression, whether it be "comfort
and welfare," "general welfare," "comfort and welfare of society," "greatest welfare
of the people," "great public needs," or any other like expression . . . some such
caution as is indicated by the Massachusetts courts is to be exercised against allowing
the general import of the phrase too free a scope.
Id. at 401, 129 A. at 516.
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power may include, is to be determined from the decided cases in
the light of each one's facts and, when new facts arise, from the
process of reason which the judicial mind brings to bear on the
question. After all, in many instances at least, this judicial function
is so involved with the individual sociological views of the judges
as to make it difficult to distinguish the relative contribution which
reason and social views make to the blended result. This perhaps
accounts for the expanding development of the power in such de-
gree as to keep it reasonably abreast of the growing conceptions of
the public, for it is doubtless true that as new social ideas find con-
siderable acceptance among the people they will in due course
reflect themselves in the subconscious social points of view of
judges and thus result in an enlargement of the subjects amenable
to the power's regulation.7
AESTHETICS IN THE EARLY PERIOD: TRADITIONAL DISREGARD
At the turn of the century and during the three decades which fol-
lowed, the prevailing judicial attitude toward aesthetic zoning was
basically twofold. Courts refused to uphold zoning ordinances which
were either solely or primarily motivated by aesthetic considerations.
Even when aesthetics was a reasonably obvious factor in the creation
of the regulation, courts-while either simply alluding to or completely
disregarding aesthetic viewpoints-would not necessarily invalidate
such a regulation so long as there was some other independent basis
sufficient to warrant the employment of the police power. Abused and
neglected, aesthetics achieved, at best, a pedestrian acknowledgement
by courts during this period. "Regulations based on aesthetic considera-
tions are not in accord with the spirit of our democratic institutions." 8
The disdain which confronted aesthetics was due to two public consid-
erations which, at the time, were quite predominant. First, aesthetic
considerations were deemed luxuries to please the whims of the aristo-
cratic and the idle rather than a necessity which alone justified the ex-
ercise of the police power to take property without compensation.9
The other primary objection to aesthetics was that, founded upon a
subjective nature, what was attractive to one individual was an abomi-
nation for another.'0 Therefore, no intelligible standard could objec-
7. Id. at 402, 129 A. at 516.
8. City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231, 249-50, 256 S.W. 489, 495 (1923).
9. City of Pasaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1905); accord, Curran v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 P. 261 (1910); Haller Sign Works
v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 94 N.E. 920 (1911).
10. Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 407, 129 A. 512, 518 (Ch. 1925); Forbes v.
Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 181, 180 N.E. 767, 773 (1932).
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tively be obtained, and aesthetics had no standing to be considered
among other factors embraced by the general welfare.
The area most severely scorned by courts in which aesthetics was an
obvious consideration was billboard regulation." Control of billboard
advertising on behalf of any aesthetic consideration was Virtually ne-
gated. The courts either omitted such obvious considerations alto-
gether 12 or simply adhered to the prevalent doctrine that while a city,
in the proper exercise of its police power, may adopt billboard regula-
tions, they must be reasonable and not prompted by aesthetic consid-
erations.' 3 Most restrictions were dictated by concern for public health
and safety,' 4 and could be categorized as twofold. First, billboards, being
constructed of cheap flimsy material, usually wood, were placed along
streets or on the borders of vacant lots. Noting that they were easily
blown over by strong gusts of wind, courts held that billboards of suf-
ficient height and proximity to the public thoroughfare were dangerous
to the safety of passersby. 15 Billboard regulations were also upheld to
prevent the convenient concealment of hiding places for criminals and
loiterers, for eliminating immoral sexual activity, and for furnishing
protection against attacks on women and children.' Public health
considerations sought to eliminate debris which collected in such areas
and to prevent fires.' 7
There were other areas in which the aesthetic factor was considerable,
yet ignored. In Cochran v. Preston,8 the Maryland Court of Appeals,
in passing upon the appellant's contention that the sole purpose of the
zoning regulation was to preserve the beauty and architectural sym-
metry of the environment of the Washington Monument, stated:
We find a more substantial reason for its enactment in the sugges-
tion of the counsel for the appellees that its purpose was to protect
11. A considerable amount of literature has discussed aesthetics and billboard regu-
lation. See Moore, Regulation of Outdoor Advertising for Aesthetic Purposes, 8 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 191 (1963); Proffitt, Public Aesthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 151 (1931);
Rodda, supra note 2.
12. City of Chicago v. Gunning Sys., 214 Ill. 628, 73 N.E. 1035 (1905); Bill Posting
Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N.J.L. 72, 58 A. 342 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
13. Varney v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909); Commonwealth v. Boston Ad-
vertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 74 N.E. 601 (1905); State v. Whitlock, 149 N.C. 542, 63 S.E. 123
(1908).
14. See Agnor, supra note 2, at 266-67.
15. In re Wilshire, 103 F. 620 (S.D. Cal. 1900); City of Rochester v. West, 164 N.Y. 510,
58 N.E. 673 (1900).
16. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1917); Commonwealth v. Boston
Advertising Co., 188 Mass. 348, 353, 74 N.E. 601, 603 (1905); see Bellaire v. Lamkin, 159
Tex. 141, 317 S.W.2d 43 (1958).
17. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1917).
18. 108 Md. 220, 70 A. 113 (1908).
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handsome buildings and their contents, located in that vicinity,
and also the works of art clustered there, from the ravages of fire.'9
In 1921, the Supreme Court of Texas, in Spann v. City of Dallas,20
emphasized the prevailing tenor of that time:
It is doubtless offensive to many people for a store to be located
within a given area where they own residence property. Others
would possibly regard the store as a convenience. An aesthetic
sense might condemn a store building within a residence district
as an alien thing and out of place, or as marring its architectural
symmetry. But it is not the law of this land that a man may be de-
prived of the lawful use of his property because his tastes are not
in accord with those of his neighbors. The law is that he may use
it as he chooses, regardless of their tastes, if in its use he does not
harm them.2'
Such remark illustrates the genuine lack of judicial concern in at-
tempting to prevent blatantly incongruous uses which resulted in er-
ratically grotesque aesthetic patterns. In addition to allowing various
kinds of retail stores and other business properties to be randomly
located in residential areas,22 courts permitted the more glaring mis-
placement of gasoline stations in residential districts.2 3 Ordinances
which attempted to prevent such inharmonious uses in residential dis-
tricts were considered to have been enacted to satisfy the subjective
desires of the inhabitants affected by such aesthetically offensive use.
Resulting depreciation in property value was, to a degree, considered
to be the direct result of aesthetic considerations and merely the opera-
tive consequence of an incidence to the location of any lawful business
which might be placed in such an area.24
Aesthetic objectives were also obvious in zoning ordinances which
attempted to effect standard patterns of minimum floor space measured
by indices of square footage. Courts often recognized the primary un-
derlying aesthetic aim of such regulation:
19. Id. at 229, 70 A. at 114; Atkinson v. Piper, 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923); see
Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
20. 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513 (1921).
21. Id. at 358, 235 S.W. at 516. Such prevailing attitude was premised on the maxim:
Sic utere tuo ut alienum no laedas (Use your own property in such a manner as not to in-
jure that of another).
22. Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828 (1913); People ex rel. Friend v. City of
Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609 (1913); State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn.
226, 158 N.W. 1017 (1916); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654,
148 N.E. 842 (1925).
23. MacRae v. City of Fayettesville, 198 N.C. 51, 150 S.E. 810 (1929).
24. City of Texarkana v. Mabry, 94 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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Beautiful city residences, homologous lines in architecture and
symmetry in construction appeal to artistic tastes should be re-
spected in connection with substantial zoning regulations for the
promotion of the public welfare, but aesthetics alone for the pur-
pose of zoning ordinances do not seem to be a source of police
power, according to the weight of authority.25
While difficult to pinpoint an exact date, the years immediately prior
to 1940 are an appropriate point at which to posit some observations
regarding the initial growth of aesthetic zoning. The earliest cases, in
which the concept of aesthetics was either haphazardly discounted or
notoriously ignored, furnished an interesting development which, if
seemingly unsophisticated and somewhat banal in assessing societal
growth as spurred by land-use control, was at least consistent with the
trend which resulted. As a consequence of the 1926 Supreme Court
decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 26 in which com-
prehensive zoning was constitutionally upheld, zoning objectives for
which the police power could be utilized were clarified. To the phrase
"public health, safety, and morals," was added "general welfare," even
though this term had been sporadically implemented by the courts
prior to the Euclid decision. A key passage of the Euclid decision ex-
plains the fundamental necessity for the additional term:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have
developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will
continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands and in urban communities. Regu-
lations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly
sustained, a century ago, or even a half century ago, probably
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive ... the scope
of their application must expand or meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation.2 7
While Euclid opened the floodgates for possible judicial implemen-
tation of aesthetics as a factor integral to the "general welfare," there
was no flood. The impact of Euclid, however, slowly became obvious.
25. Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 471, 293 N.W. 326, 328 (1940). The Supreme Court
of Nebraska noted that the term "public welfare"--while having undergone an inter-
pretative expansion-was still not so embracive as to include purely aesthetic considerations.
26. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
27. Id. at 386-87.
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Consequently, courts demonstrated an increasingly recognizable per-
spicacity in depicting factual ramifications in which aesthetic considera-
tions were present. Even where decisions upheld regulations as long as
aesthetics was not the controlling factor,28 the treatment of such con-
cept, while less than princely, at least began to transcend the abuse it
was dealt during the earlier years. Perhaps, most importantly, decisions
after Euclid in which aesthetics appeared began to mirror a more direct
honesty as compared to that which, earlier, had been at best, compro-
mising.
CURRENT STATUS: AESTHETICS AS A VALID AUXILIARY CONSIDERATION
In Welch v. Swasey,29 a case concerning height limitations upon
buildings to be erected in Boston, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court stated:
The inhabitants of a city or town cannot be compelled to give up
rights in property, or to pay taxes for purely aesthetic objects; but
if the primary and substantive purpose of the legislation is such as
justifies the act, considerations of taste and beauty may enter in, as
auxiliary.30
When appealed to the United States Supreme Court,81 it was found that
the "real purpose of these acts was aesthetics, 32 but nevertheless what
the lower court had said regarding the auxiliary status of aesthetics
was reiterated3 It was the Welch case which, against the overwhelming
trend of authority at that time, gave aesthetics its initial liberating
impetus that helped to foster aesthetic objectives in zoning legislation.
But it was later, when coupled with the 1926 Euclid decision, that the
endorsement of aesthetic aims would begin to significantly emerge with
some noticeable strength and slowly gain an increasing respectability.
Meanwhile, there appeared a cluster of decisions, the language of
28. People v. Dickenson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809 (Super. Ct. 1959); Gion-
friddo v. Town of Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 81 A.2d 266 (1951); Pearce v. Village of Edina,
263 Minn. 553, 118 S.W.2d 659 (1962); Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 139 So. 2d 660
(1962); Miller v. Kansas City, 358 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. App. 1962); Little Pep Delmonico
Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 252 N.C. 324, 113 S.E.2d 422 (1960); State v.
Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108 S.E.2d 74 (1959); Davis v. McPherson, 58 Ohio Op. 253, 72 Ohio
L. Abs. 232, 132 N.E.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1955); City of Norris v. Bradford, 204 Tenn. 319,
321 S.W.2d 543 (1958); Hagman v. Slaughter, 49 Tenn. App. 338, 354 S.W.2d 818 (1962).
29. 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907).
30. Id. at 375, 79 N.E. at 746.
31. 214 US. 91 (1909).
32.- Id. at 96.
33. "That in addition to these sufficient facts, considerations of an aesthetic nature also
entered into the reasons for their passage, would not invalidate them." Id. at 108.
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which, while seemingly subtle, was quite favorable to the aesthetic
cause. This could be seen, for example, in cases of billboard regulation
in which appeared, among the more traditional objectives justifying
the police power exercise, the fact that billboards were "also inartistic
and unsightly."34 Such a terse acknowledgement, which delegated aes-
thetics to a supportive position, was nonetheless significant in helping
to ignite the commencement of a new course toward aesthetic recogni-
tion.8 5 Courts began to contribute significant language which, couched
in an appraisal of the police power function, recognized that the state
may control the conduct of individuals by any recognition which upon
reasonable grounds could be regarded as promoting the common wel-
fare, convenience, or prosperity of the public community at large.88
A major case of this slowly expanding minority that exemplified a
direct concern for aesthetics was State ex rel. Twin City v. Houghton,87
in which mandamus was denied to compel the granting of a permit to
erect a cereal mill in a residential district. The court recognized the
effect such incongruous land-use would have on adjacent property in
that area. In acknowledging that it was time for courts to recognize
aesthetics as a valuable factor in life, the court stated that:
... giving the people a means to secure for that portion of a city,
wherein they establish their homes, fit and harmonious surround-
ings, promotes contentment, induces further efforts to enhance the
appearance and value of the home, fosters civic pride, and thus
tends to produce a better type of citizen .... People are beginning
to realize this more than before, and some are calling for city plan-
ning, by which the individual homes may be segregated from not
only industrial and mercantile districts, but also from the districts
devoted to hotels and apartments. 8
In an important early case sustaining set-back lines, the Connecticut
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of aesthetics as an auxil-
iary factor. In addition to enumerating traditional aims employed to
effect the public health and safety, the court also commented:
Streets of reasonable width add to the value of the land along the
34. St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 145, 137 S.W.
929, 942 (1911), appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913).
5. See Dukeminier, supra note 1. at 219-20.
36. State v. Wilson, 101 Kan. 789, 168 P. 679 (1917); see St. Louis Poster Advertising Co.
v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 (1915),
appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918).
37. 144 Minn. 1, 176 N.W. 159 (1920), rev'g on rehearing 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885
(1919).
38. Id. at 20, 176 N.W. at 162.
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street, and enhance the general beauty of land and buildings in
the neighborhood and greatly increase the beauty of neighbor-
hood.3 9
The year 1923 provided three of the most important cases of this
expanding course acknowledging the aesthetic factor in zoning. The
Kansas Supreme Court noted there was an aesthetic and cultural side
of municipal development which, within reasonable limitations, could
be properly fostered.40 The court also noted that the legislation which
would provide for such growth was "merely a liberalized application of
the general welfare purposes of state and federal constitutions."' The
Louisiana Supreme Court discussed aesthetics in the perspective of
neighborhood nuisances which, while potentially threatening property
values, were not limited to merely noises or odors but also embraced
visual situations that constituted an "eyesore." Such difference, the
court postulated, "is not in principle, but only in degree. '42 The court
added, quite significantly:
If by the term "aesthetic consideration" is meant a regard merely
for outward appearances, for good taste in the matter of beauty of
the neighborhood itself, we do not observe any substantial reason
for saying that such consideration is not a matter of general wel-
fare.43
In holding reasonable a zoning regulation that prohibited the enlarge-
ment of an existing dairy and milk pasteurizing plant in a residential
district, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are relative in their
nature. With the passing of time, social standards conform to new
ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more refined, and
39. Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 364-65, 111 A. 354, 356 (1920); accord,
Thille v. Board of Pub. Works, 82 Cal. App. 187, 255 P. 294 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Pritz v.
Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); see Randall, Validity of Use of Set-Back Lines
for Street Widening, 13 MARQ. L. REv. 103 (1929).
40. Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 P. 99 (1923).
41. Id. at 157, 214 P. at 102.
42. State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97 So. 440, 444 (1923).
The court also provided an important clue regarding the potential elasticity of the term
"general welfare:"
The beauty of a fashionable residence in a city is for the comfort and happiness of the
residents and it sustains in a general way the value of property in the neighborhood.
It is, therefore, as much a matter of general welfare as in any other condition that
fosters comfort or happiness and consequent values generally of the property in the
neighborhood.
Id. The court's remarks regarding property values, while then not of any paramount
significance, would eventually prove prophetic for many modern cases in this area.
43. Id.
212
Vol. 11: 204, 1972
Comments
that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured . ..
our ideals [have become] more exacting. Nauseous smells have
always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and discor-
dant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities.
The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of
an ultra-aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to
plague the average or dominant human sensibilities well may be
pondered. 44
In 1925 the Supreme Court of Minnesota45 demonstrated its general
approval of this expanding trend toward recognizing aesthetics in its
discussion of the police power. The court noted that the police power
was "in its nature indefinable, and quickly responsible in the interest
of common welfare, to changing conditions .... 46 The court also
observed that while social relations were becoming more complex, re-
strictions on individual rights were becoming increasingly more com-
mon.
The Indiana Supreme Court, in dissecting the limits to which the
police power may be exercised, noted:
Under a liberalized construction of the general welfare purposes
of state and Federal Constitutions there is a trend in the modem
decisions (which we approve) to foster, under the police power, an
aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development-to prevent
a thing that offends the sense of hearing and smelling .... 47
After Euclid, decisions in the next quarter century provided the nec-
essary judicial acknowledgement that gave aesthetics a guaranteed status
as, at least, a relevant supporting factor in zoning legislation.4 While
certain courts stated that aesthetics alone would still not substantiate
a zoning regulation, they did simultaneously state that an auxiliary role
of an aesthetic aim could be validly considered. 49 Aesthetic considera-
44. State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N.W. 451, 455 (1923).
45. State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925), aff'd, 273 U.S.
671 (1927).
46. Id. at 150, 204 N.W. at 570.
47. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 89, 172 N.E.
309, 312 (1930).
48. Courts that endorsed this position often used varying phrases to support such
contention, e.g., aesthetics were regarded "while wholly not without weight." State Bank
& Trust Co. v. Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (1934); Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166,
180 N.E. 767 (1932); "Aesthetic considerations are in themselves entitled to weight alone
with other considerations." Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243
(1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945); "Aesthetics may be an incidental but cannot be
the moving factor." Hitchman v. Oakland Township, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951);
Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943); Wolverine Sign Works v. City
of Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich. 205, 271 N.W. 823 (1937).
49. Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc'y v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932);
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tions were found to be within the reasonable scope of the police power
to preserve from destruction the scenic beauties bestowed on the com-
monwealth by nature. Other protections were the promotion of safety
and travel on the public thoroughfares and the protection of travellers
from the barbaric intrusion of unwelcome advertising.50 Courts spoke
openly of beautiful parks, acknowledging that as "a chance to develop
or gratify a love of natural beauty, it is a proper function of govern-
ment to provide places in such a community where commercialism, un-
pleasant noises and scenes are eliminated.""' A growing tendency was
firmly manifested to accord greater weight to aesthetic considerations
in cases that challenged the validity of ordinances which regulated bill-
board and outdoor advertising and activities connected therewith.
52
Courts also realized the need to help sponsor the attractiveness of resi-
dential communities.
53
In 1954, a remark by the Supreme Court, in Berman v. Parker,5
4
helped to firmly lodge aesthetics as a legitimate consideration in legis-
lative deliberations:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the Legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.55
The effect of this case was quite significant with regard to expanding
the scope of what was meant by the term "public welfare." Mr. Doug-
las' oft-quoted statement has appeared in every significant aesthetic
Trust Co. v. Chicago, 408 Ill. 91, 96 N.E.2d 499 (1951); Neef v. City of Springfield, 380
Ill. 275, 43 N.E. 2d 947 (1942); Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313,
78 N.W. 843 (1956); City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La. 651, 89 So. 2d 156 (1956); 122 Main
Street Corp. v. City of Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13 (1949); City of St. Louis v.
Freidman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475 (1948); Sundeen v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253, 141 A. 142
(1928); West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
50. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 296 U.S. 543 (1935).
51. Chicago Park Dist. v. Canfield, 370 Ill. 447, 453, 19 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1939).
52. Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Federal
Elec. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 398 Ill. 142, 75 N.E.2d 359 (1947); City of New Orleans
v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); 1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312
Mich. 352, 20 N.W.2d 217 (1945); Oscar P. Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn.
271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1945); Criterion Serv., Inc. v. City of East Cleveland, 55 Ohio L. Abs.
90, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1949).
53. Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949); Lexington
v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936); Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant
Pavillion, 3 N.J. Super. 222, 66 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. 1949).
54. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
55. Id. at 33.
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zoning case that followed. The fact that Berman was an eminent do-
main case and not a zoning conflict is completely immaterial. 56 The
Berman court contributed language which tended to help obscure the
distinction between domain and zoning insofar as they relate to aes-
thetics:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than
spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate
the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of
cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable bur-
den. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community
which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men
turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open
sewer may ruin a river.57
Two points are particularly important here. First, as courts handed
down decisions in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's, there was
a marked laxity in pinpointing the degree to which the aesthetic factor
could be implemented as a consideration in zoning enactments. Quite
cleverly, courts did not prescribe the degree to which aesthetics could
be stretched. While advocating the auxiliary theory of aesthetics, courts
employed language that was rather casual in ascertaining the precision
by which aesthetics was to be measured. 5 Consequently, courts tended
to display a greater degree of flexibility than was intended by a proper
interpretation of the auxiliary rule. Under the auxiliary factor theory,
a zoning regulation need not be a necessity but need only be substan-
tially related to promoting the general welfare of the community to
56. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 272, 69 N.W.2d
217, 222-23 (1955). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin also questioned whether the tradi-
tional rule regarding aesthetics was valid any longer.
57. 348 U.S. at 32-33. See Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1955).
58. The language of the courts, recognizing the auxiliary factor status of aesthetics,
often: allows a greater degree of flexibility than is probably the intent of the auxiliary
theory. Stone v. City of Maitland, 446 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1971); City of St. Paul v.
Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 413 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1969); see, e.g.,
McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 255 F.2d 154, 158 (8th Cir. 1958); Bachman v. State, 235
Ark. 339, 359 S.W.2d 815 (1962); Petition of Franklin Builders, Inc., 207 A.2d 12, 29 (Del.
1964); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Ky. 1964); Wright v. Michaud, 160
Me. 164, 173, 200 A.2d 543, 548 (1964); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 499, 162 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1968); Deimeke v. State Highway
Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Mo. 1968); Town of New Boston v. Coombs, 284 A.2d 920
(N.H. 1971); Piscitelli v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. 589, 598, 248 A.2d 274, 278 (1968);
Klotz v. Board of Adjustment, 90 N.J. Super. 295, 298, 217 A.2d 168, 169 (Super. Ct. 1966);
State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1968); Kenyon Peck, Inc. v.
Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969); DeWitt v. Town of Brattleboro Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 262 A.2d 472, 476 (Vt. 1970); Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 39-40, 119
S.E.2d 833, 843-44 (1960); State ex rel. American Oil Co. v. Bessent, 27 Wis. 2d 537, 545,
135 N.W.2d 317, 322 (1965).
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meet the constitutional requirements of reasonableness demanded by
the police power.
Besides the lack of precision in the language of decisions, another
problem confronted the courts: Where the regulation is predominately
motivated by aesthetics, will the courts content themselves to subordi-
nate such prevailing aesthetic considerations to the judicially estab-
lished auxiliary status. Further, will the court sustain the regulation
only so long as an independent basis which justifies the police power
exercise can be pinpointed?
THE EVOLUTION COMPLETED: AESTHETICS IN NEW YORK
In 1963, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Stover5 9
a landmark case in the development of aesthetics in land-use planning.
The case is of extreme significance in that it not only presented the
next logical step in furtherance of aesthetics, but also represented the
culmination of a considerable wealth of New York cases that had simul-
taneously paralleled the national development.
The early New York cases had much in common with those of other
jurisdictions in which courts either discarded or disguised aesthetic
objectives and directed considerations of zoning regulations toward
public health, safety, and morals. Courts either omitted any mention
of aesthetics, instead proceeding to effect some stretched justification
to sustain a certain regulation, ° or simply invalidated the ordinance
where a basis with the traditional objectives could not be reasonably
substantiated, even where the aesthetic factor was considerable. 61
Whatever the particular nature of the case, these early decisions clearly
held that aesthetics could not furnish the sole basis for prompting the
employment of the police power.62 However, the presence of an aes-
thetic purpose, even when alluded to, would not necessarily void a
regulation provided another basis was found to uphold it.63 In 1925,
one court redefined the scope within which the police power was to
59. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
60. City of Rochester v. West, 164 N.Y. 510, 514, 58 N.E. 673, 674 (1900).
61. People ex rel. M. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E. 17
(1909).
62. Isenbarth v. Bartnett, 206 App. Div. 546, 549, 201 N.Y.S. 383, 386 (1923); City
of Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 612, 195 N.Y.S. 225, 226-27 (1922); Melita v. Nolan,
126 Misc. 345, 347, 213 N.Y.S. 674, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1926); City of Syracuse v. Snow, 123 Misc.
568, 574, 205 N.Y.S. 785, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Buffalo v. Kellner, 90 Misc. 407, 414-15, 154
N.Y. 472, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
63. Cordis v. Hutton, 146 Misc. 10, 262 N.Y.S. 539 (Sup. Ct. 132).
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act for the general welfare. 64 Certain cases in the late 1920's provided
strong dicta which, collectively, were to contribute to an increasing
group of cases that began to question the role of aesthetics. 65 By 1930
Judge Cardozo pronounced the aesthetic dilemma to be "unsettled. '66
In cases that followed, the New York Court of Appeals began to dissect
the strategic influence which aesthetics subtly demonstrated in legis-
lative enactments. 67 Consequently, aesthetics was soon acknowledged
as a valid auxiliary consideration.6 Zoning regulations finally extended
64. In Wolfsuhn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925), the court of appeals
discussed the general welfare with regard to the changing times and furnished one of the
more important passages from the early New York cases:
Of course zoning regulations are an exercise of the police power, and as we approach
the decision of this question we must realize that the application of the police power
has been greatly extended during a comparatively recent period and that while the
fundamental rule must be observed that there is some evil existent or reasonably to
be apprehended which the police power may be invoked to prevent and that the
remedy proposed must be generally adapted to that purpose, the limit upon condi-
tions held to come within this rule has been greatly enlarged. The power is not
limited to regulations designed to promote the public health, public morals, or public
safety or to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary, but extends
to so dealing with conditions which exist as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity.
Id. at 298, 150 N.E. at 122.
65. People v. Wolf, 127 Misc. 382, 216 N.Y.S. 741 (Nassau County Ct. 1926). See also
People v. Sterling, 128 Misc. 650, 653, 220 N.Y.S. 315, 318 (Sup. Ct. 1927) ("We have
reached a point in the development of the police power where an aesthetic purpose needs
but little assistance from a practical one in order to withstand an attack on constitutional
grounds.").
66. People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 172 N.E. 485 (1930), in which Judge Cardozo
stated, quite significantly:
The organs of smell and hearing, assailed by sound and odors too pungent to be
borne, have been ever favored of the law, more conspicuously, it seems, than sight,
which perhaps is more inured to what is ugly or disfigured. Even so, the test for all
the senses, for sight as well as smell and hearing, has been the effect of the offensive
practice upon the reasonable man or woman of average sensibilities. One of the un-
settled questions of the law is the extent to which the concept of nuisance may be
enlarged by legislation so as to give protection to sensibilities that are merely cultural
or aesthetic. The question need not be answered to decide the case at hand.
Id. at 248-49, 172 N.E. 486-87.
67. In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931), it was said:
Aesthetic considerations are, fortunately, not wholly without weight in a practical
world. Perhaps such consideration need not be disregarded in the formulation of
regulations to promote the public welfare .... Public welfare" is a concept which
in recent years has been widened to include many matters which in other times were
regarded as outside the limits of the governmental concern. As yet, at least, no judicial
definition has been formulated which is wide enough to include purely aesthetic
considerations.
Id. at 230-31, 177 N.E. at 430.
68. People v. Calvar Corp., 69 N.Y.S.2d 272, 279 (Naussau County Ct. 1940). The court
in Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
1940), furnished a statement of relative significance:
For years the courts have strained to sustain the validity of regulatory or prohibitory
ordinances of this character upon the basis of public safety. They decided that aes-
thetic considerations could afford no basis for sustaining such legislation .... But the
views of the public change in the passing of years. What was deemed wrong in the
past is looked upon very often today as eminently proper . . . .Among the changes
which have come in the viewpoint of the public is the idea that our cities should be
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beyond the traditionally narrow scope of public health and safety069
Numerous cases emerged that furnished the launching ground which,
while supposedly restricting aesthetics to a secondary purpose, actually
helped, by their shrewdly implicative language, to accord aesthetics an
influence that was quite considerable.70
In 1963, the Stover decision was handed down by a nearly unanimous
court. In Stover, the appellants, in 1956, hung a clothesline with old
clothes and rags in the front yard of their home as a form of peaceful
protest against the high taxesimposed by the city. During each of the
five succeeding years, the defendants added another clothesline in order
to protest their continuing disenchantment with the municipal assess-
ments. By 1961, six lines from which hung tattered clothing, old uni-
forms, underwear, rags, and scarecrows were strung across the appel-
lants' yard. During that year the city enacted an ordinance that pro-
hibited the erection and maintenance of clotheslines or other devices
for hanging clothes or other fabrics in a front or side yard abutting the
street. The ordinance provided for a variance in case of hardship due
to area limitations of one's property. There was also an opportunity
for appeal should the variance be denied. The appellants' application
for a hardship permit having been denied, the Stovers took no appeal
and the clotheslines were not removed. The city, relying upon the ordi-
nance, charged the Stovers with violating its provisions.
The defendants claimed that the ordinance as applied to them was
unconstitutional both as an interference with free speech and as a de-
privation of property without due process. The court dealt with the
defendants' contention quite efficaciously. In assuming that the non-
verbal expression was a proper form of speech within the meaning of
the first amendment, the court commented that such rights are subject
to reasonable regulation, as was provided by the particular ordinance
in question.
beautiful and that the creation of such beauty tends to the happiness, contentment,
comfort, prosperity and general welfare of our citizens.
Id. at 1019, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
69. People ex rel. Barker v. Elkin, 196 Misc. 188, 190, 80 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (Ct. Spec.
Sess. 1948); see New York Trap Rock Corp. v. Clarkstown, 1 App. Div. 2d 890, 891, 149
N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (1956).
70. Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 192 Misc. 912, 916, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812, 817 (Sup. Ct.
1948); see New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 151,
176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961); Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 389, 144 N.E.2d
381, 384, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1957); Village of Larchmont v. Levine, 225 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Village of Larchmont v. Sutton, 30 Misc. 2d 245, 249, 217 N.Y.S.2d 929,
935 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See also Town of Vestal v. Bennett, 109 Misc. 41, 44, 104 N.Y.S.2d 830,
832 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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Although the city may not interfere with nonviolent speech, it may
proscribe conduct which incites to violence or works an injury on
property, and the circumstances that such prohibition has an im-
pact on speech or expression, otherwise permissible, does not nec-
essarily invalidate the legislation.71
The ordinance, the court stated, bore no relationship to the dissemina-
tion of ideas or opinions. It was held the defendants were not privileged
in violating the ordinance in the manner which they employed. "It is
obvious that the value of their "protest" lay not in its message but in its
offensiveness." 72
The City of Rye claimed the ordinance prohibiting clotheslines in
front and side yards was valid because it tended to reduce the traffic
collisions by providing better visibility and enhancement of pedes-
trians' safety. It is important to note that the residence of the Stovers
was located at the corner of two intersecting avenues. Three clothes-
lines were strung from the porch of the house across the front yard to
trees along one avenue; the other three extended from the porch across
the side yard to trees on the other avenue. The city asserted a valid
claim under the circumstances, especially in that the extraordinarily
unsightliness of the clotheslines would serve to distract drivers as they
approached the intersection.7 3
In questioning the causal connection between the traffic accidents
and the visually distracting situation, the court found the plaintiff's
contentions were too theoretical. Instead, it held:
... it is our opinion that the ordinance may be sustained as an
attempt to preserve the residential appearance of the city and its
property values by banishing, insofar as practicable, unsightly
clotheslines from yards abutting a public street. In other words,
the statute, though based on what may be termed aesthetic consid-
71. 12 N.Y.2d at 469, 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 739-40.
72. Id. at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740. A comprehensive discussion of the
defendants' contention appears in Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amend-
ment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81 (1964). See also Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," The First Amend-
ment and the Boston Tea Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 185 (1970). Stover is cited as authority
in each of the following cases which deal with the same first amendment problem but in a
different context: People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 118-19, 257 N.E.2d 30, 32, 308 N.Y.S.2d
846, 849 (1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 531 (1971); Gibbons v. O'Reilly, 44 Misc. 2d 353, 355, 253
N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Sup. Ct. 1964); see Cactus Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App.
38, 480 P.2d 375 (1971).
73. But see Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Purposes-An Appraisal of
People v. Stover, 15 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 33, 38, 40-41 (1963). For an interesting assessment
of the Stover problem under the theory of nuisance, see 49 CORNELL L.Q. 310-11 (1963).
See generally Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1939); Comment,
Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action- 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1075 (1970).
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erations, proscribes conduct which offends sensibilities and tends
to debase the community and reduce real estate values.74
Having reviewed the trends in aesthetic zoning up to that time, the
court held that once it was conceded aesthetics was a valid subject of
legislative concern, it was inevitable that reasonable legislation de-
signed to promote that end was a valid exercise of the police power.70
The focal point was the element of reasonableness of the control when
applied to a particular factual context. Quoting Dukeminier76 the
court concluded:
Consequently, whether such a statute or ordinance should be
voided should depend upon whether the restrictions was "an arbi-
trary and irrational method of achieving an attractive efficiently
functioning, prosperous community-and not whether the objec-
tives were primarily aesthetic." . . . And, indeed, this view finds
support in an ever-increasing number of cases from other jurisdic-
tions which recognize that aesthetic considerations alone may war-
rant an exercise of the police power."
Holding the ordinance to be regulatory rather than prohibitive, the
court proceeded to define the standard by which visual offensiveness
could be measured. The court stated the ordinance imposed no arbi-
trary or capricious standard of beauty or conformity upon the commu-
nity. Rather, it simply proscribed conduct that was unnecessarily offen-
sive to the visual sensibilities of the average individual.78
As might have been expected, the impact of Stover was considerable.
While the New York courts no longer felt constrained to employ clever
word games7 9 regarding the degree to which aesthetics was to be ac-
corded legislative status, the courts were, at the same time, cognizant
of the limitations by which aesthetics could be effectively controlled. 0
One unusual application of the Stover holding was in Paterson v. Uni-
versity of State of New York,"' a suit challenging the validity of a statute
74. 12 N.Y.2d at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
75. Id. at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
76. See note I supra.
77. 12 N.Y.2d at 467, 191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
78. Id. at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
79. The author notes the varying degrees of the word "merely" and the use of the
word in other adjectival forms in relation to aesthetics. Anderson, supra note 73, at 36-37.
80. In its opinion, the Stover court was quick to point out that there may be instances
"in which the legislative body goes too far in the name of aesthetics." 12 N.Y.2d at 468,
191 N.E.2d at 275, 240 N.Y.S. at 738. Such admonition was heeded in a case that followed
Stover in the same year. Chusud Realty Corp. v. Village of Kensington, 40 Misc. 2d 259,
264, 243 N.Y.S.2d 149, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
81. 40 Misc. 2d 1023, 244 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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purporting to license landscape architects. Citing Stover, 2 the court
held that the duties and responsibilities of a professional landscape
architect affect matters of the health and safety of communities in
relation to aesthetics. Therefore, the statute, that not only licensed
landscape architects but also regulated the practice of their work, was
deemed a reasonable exercise of the police power. The court took
judicial notice of "the myriad of consequences which may flow from
improper drainage and the flooding of structures and roadways. '" ' 3
In 1967, the New York Court of Appeals decided Cromwell v. Fer-
rier.84 In that case the owner of a tract of land, bisected by a highway,
operated a diner and service station on one side of the highway. He had
already begun to erect signs on the opposite side of the highway to
advertise his business when he was served with a stop order by the re-
spondent building inspector. The order, later upheld by the zoning
board, stated that the proposed signs under construction violated a
town ordinance that prohibited "non-accessory" signs-85 The court of
appeals sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Ferrier is significant for two reasons. First, it unequivocally pro-
claimed aesthetics alone to be a valid basis for zoning. This is important
since although Stover held the same, the Stover opinion was inherently
tempered by underlying considerations of property values.,6 The court
addressed itself to the problem of the proliferation of signs and bill-
boards, noting that since a quarter of a century previous to that time,
while outdoor advertising had become a less important facet of the ad-
vertising business, the numbers of such objects have substantially in-
creased through the years. Such increase has resulted in a severe blight
upon the national landscape.8 7 Second, the type of regulation imposed
in Ferrier was different. In Stover, the ordinance was regulatory; in
Ferrier, prohibitory. The difference was that the former provided an
opportunity to apply for a variance, coupled with appeal proceedings.
In Ferrier, no such exceptions were allowed. The ordinance restricting
non-accessory signs was a blanket prohibition.
82. Id. at 1037, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 409. The court applied the Stover holding and stated
that aesthetics was a valid subject of legislative concern, and that reasonable legislation
designed to promote that end was a valid and permissible exercise of the police power.
83. Id.
84. 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
85. Accessory signs.are those which are related to an establishment on the same lot,
while non-accessory signs are those which are physically not a part of the business
premises for which they advertise.
86. 12 N.Y.2d at 466, 191 N.E.2d at 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
87. 19 N.Y.2d at 271-72, 225 N.E.2d at 754-55, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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The import of the court's holding is somewhat unclear. Employing
a prohibitory regulation, the court did not furnish an intelligible index
or standard by which to measure the unreasonableness of sign board
ordinances. The court did not address itself to any land-use control
factors which, to some degree, always shape the outcome of such deci-
sions. The court merely noted the overall effect of the growth of out-
door advertising signs and their unattractive effect on the environment.
In failing to promulgate workable standards by which to evaluate the
validity of ordinances, the Ferrier court leaves open the problem to
what degree, if any, can the power to legislate for aesthetic ends be
controlled or restricted?
The New York cases that have followed Ferrier may be placed in two
categories. There are those which adhered to the basic Stover premise
that once it is conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative
concern, then reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a
valid, permissible utilization of the police power.88 Certain cases that
have adhered to this viewpoint are more representative of the land-use
control situations involving aesthetics. Such cases have indicated that it
is now unquestioned that aesthetics alone can warrant the exercise of
the police power.8 9 The second group of cases suggests an endorsement
of Ferrier in that, while courts are willing to apply an aesthetic index
as a basis by which a particular problem may be measured, they leave
unsettled and unclear the reasonable standard by which such aesthetic
criterion is initially founded. For example, New York courts have ex-
tended the police power to situations where an individual's intellectual
and spiritual needs should be taken into account without really giving
an adequate basis for such justification. 0 The application of aesthetics
by the courts-some of which are very brief, conclusively written opin-
ions that lack analytical depth-no longer seems to be by necessity, but
rather by casual reference and occasional extravagance. 91 Perhaps it
would not seem so were the courts to define more clearly the precise
criteria by which such an aesthetic ethic could be applied.
While aesthetics has finally come full circle in New York, such a
88. People v. Artrol Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 1087, 1089, 325 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803 (Village J. Ct.
1971).
89. People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 291, 258 N.E.2d 206, 210, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919, 924-25
(1970); People v. Berlin, 62 Misc. 2d 272, 272-73, 307 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (Dist. Ct. 1970).
90. Nettleton v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 193, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123, 315 N.Y.S.2d 625,
632 (1970).
91. People v. Lou Bern Broadway, Inc., 68 Misc. 2d 112, 325 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Crim. Ct.
1971); see Town of Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 63 Misc. 2d 836, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918
(Dist. Ct. 1970).
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completed evolution has not been seen elsewhere. Only two jurisdic-
tions-Oregon 92 and Hawaii, 9 have joined in the view that aesthetics
alone may warrant an exercise of the police power. A third state has
decided a case on a predominately aesthetic basis, but has not unequiv-
ocally stated its adherence to such a view.94
Aesthetics has, however, received overwhelming acknowledgement
beyond the auxiliary level when, as a proponent of the "general wel-
fare," it is linked with economic prosperity. Aesthetics has served a
vital role not only in preserving historic sites9" but also in fostering
tourism 96 in certain states. Courts in these jurisdictions, while reluctant
to uphold aesthetics solely as basis for police power intervention,9
nonetheless assert that aesthetics, when coupled with aspects of com-
mercial prosperity, consequently perpetuates the "general welfare" of
all citizens.
PROPERTY VALUES: THE OBSCURED COORDINATE
Both aesthetics and property values, though considered so different,
have been acknowledged only indirectly and to a limited extent.98
92. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). The court prodaimed its
unequivocal endorsement of aesthetics as the sole basis which may warrant police power
exercise. Id. at 49, 400 P.2d at 262. In doing so, the court felt the need to emphasize that
it was aesthetics alone which it was fostering, totally unrelated to any other concept:
The prevention of unsightliness by wholly precluding a particular use within the city
may inhibit the economic growth of the city or frustrate the desire of someone who
wishes to make the proscribed use, but the inhabitants of the city have the right to
forego the economic gain and the person whose business plans are frustrated is not
entitled to have his interest weighed more heavily than the predominant interest of
others in the community.
Id. at 50, 400 P.2d at 263.
93. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 36, 429 P.2d 825, 827 (1967).
94. Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964).
95. City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans
v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 783, 128
N.E.2d 563(1955); see Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRAcusE L. REv. 26 (1960);
Comment, Aesthetic Zoning; Preservation of Historic Areas, 29 FoRIHAM L. Rav. 729
(1961).
96. The two jurisdictions in which this concept is more prominent are Florida and
California. The major Florida cases which have dealt with this interrelationship between
aesthetics and tourism are: Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963); Sunad,
Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland
Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941). An excellent article discussing the development of
Florida cases in this area of aesthetics may be found in Little, New Attitudes About
Legal Protection for Remains of Florida's Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 459(1971). California cases dealing with similar considerations are: Carlin v. City of Palm
springs, 14 Cal. App. 3d 706, 92 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1971); Desert Outdoor Advertising v.
County of San Bernardino, 255 Cal. App. 2d 765, 63 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1968); National
Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962). See
also Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 672 (1961).
97. Cf. Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861, 862 (Fla. 1953).
98. Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote the Public Welfare?
35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
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During the early years of the century the concern for property values
was relatively obscured by the notoriety occasioned by the presence of
aesthetic objectives in zoning enactments. When courts spoke of the
indefinable term "general welfare," and referred to convenience, pros-
perity and the like, they usually never exerted themselves to attempt
a categorization of property values within such scope. Property values,
for the most part, went unnoticed. In their burdensome preoccupation
with achieving justifications of public health, safety, morals, and even
general welfare, courts simply were not altogether cognizant of the
underlying essence of property values99 and accorded them little, if any,
attention. 100 It was not until aesthetics had risen to its auxiliary status
that property values emerged from the inner recesses of previous court
decisions to become a factor worthy of judicial interest. Courts gradu-
ally became aware that, in addition to the traditional zoning objectives,
there were other ends which were of equal importance; namely, that
a certain conformity to a particular use helps stabilize and insure the
value of land in a given area; that the usefulness and value of each par-
cel, not only to the owner but also to the community, was vitally af-
fected by the use made of the adjoining parcel. 1 1 Courts were alerted
to the need for the assurance of orderliness in residential areas to foster
community development. 0 2 In the 1940's there were several cases that
illustrated the situations upon which this growing concern for property
values was predicated.
In a suit to enforce the town's zoning by-law by restraining defen-
dants from removing top soil or loam from two tracts of land, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Town of Burlington v.
Dunn,'03 supporting the auxiliary theory of aesthetics, commented on
the deleterious effects of such operation. It noted the agricultural ruin
99. Occasionally, significant dissenting opinions would realize the importance of prop-
erty values. See Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 312, 128 A. 50, 61 (1928); State ex rel.
Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 41, 256 S.W. 474, 479 (1923).
100. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925), appeal dismissed, 273
U.S. 781 (1927); Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936); State
ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925); Dundee Realty Co. v.
City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944); Stone v. Crey, 89 N.H. 483, 200 A.
517 (1938); Gabrielson v. Glen Ridge, 13 N.J. Misc. 142, 176 A. 676 (Sup. Ct. 1935);
Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 47 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
101. The basic theory underlying property values is that the general welfare of the com-
munity is superior in importance to the pecuniary profits of the individual landowner.
Fritts v. Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Ky. 1961); see Landels, Zoning: An Analysis of its
Purposes and its Legal Sanctions, 17 A.B.A.J. 163 (1931).
102. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193
N.E. 799 (1935); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E. 368
(1937).
103. 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243 (1945).
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and the valueless land which resulted. The effect of such unsightly
waste in a residential community, the court stated, could hardly be
otherwise than to permanently depress values of other lands in the
neighborhood and render them less desirable for homes.
The following year the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, in Connor v.
City of University Park,10 4 held that, under statutes authorizing them
to enact zoning regulations, cities have a duty to conserve property
values, encourage the most appropriate use of property throughout the
municipality, and not to impose any regulation that would adversely
affect the value of property or encourage an inharmonious or inappro-
priate use. The court stated that "the general welfare is served by the
promotion of prosperity and the conservation of values."'10 5 Linking
property values with aesthetics, the court noted that "harmonious ap-
pearance, appropriateness, good taste and beauty displayed in a neigh-
borhood not only tend to conserve the value of property, but foster
contentment and happiness among homeowners.' 1 0 6 In 1949, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey held valid an ordinance that excluded all
heavy industry from a small residential municipality, the physical
location of which was such that it was best suited for residential devel-
opment.10 7 There were, however, ordinance provisions for small busi-
nesses, trades, and light industries in the area. Avoiding the direct aes-
thetics issue, the court premised its decision upon the most appropriate
use of land throughout the municipality with concern for preserving
the property values and promoting steady residential growth in the
area.
In the 1940's there was a group of cases which were directly affected
by the validity and construction of zoning regulations which prescribed
minimum floor space and cubic content of residences. 08 These cases,
while stating that aesthetics alone could not warrant an exercise of the
police power, generally endorsed aesthetics in an auxiliary capacity.
The courts discussed the role of property values. While they often
found no relation between the particular regulation and the public
health, safety, or morals, courts at least acknowledged the presence
104. 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
105. Id. at 712.
106. Id.
107. Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of Creskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347
(1949).
108. Ritenour v. Dearborn, 326 Mich. 242, 40 N.W.2d 137 (1949); Elizabeth Lake Es-
tates v. Waterford Township, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W.2d 788 (1947); Frischkorn Constr. Co.
v. Redford Township Inspector, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946); Sensfsky v. Hunting-
ton Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943).
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of property values and deemed them to be worthy of an auxiliary
status, equating such values with aesthetics. One case that dealt with
ramifications of minimum floor space held that the purpose of the
ordinance was to stabilize and conserve property values, and that such
purpose was clearly within the ambit of the police power. 09 In 1946,
one court remarked that the police power was not confined solely to
traditional analyses of public health, safety and morals. Rather, the
preservation of property values, and even aesthetic considerations, may
be weighed in arriving at the determination of the reasonableness of
the regulation.110
Courts began to use aesthetic controls to preserve property values.
Emphasis upon the preservation of property values as a contribution
to the public welfare helped simplify the rationalization of aesthetic
purposes as legitimate objectives of the police power."'
In 1952, Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township,12 was decided.
The case invited great controversy among land-use scholars." 3 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld an ordinance which fixed a
minimum living-floor space of 768 square feet for a one-story dwelling,
of not less than 1000 square feet for a two story dwelling having an
attached garage, and of not less than 1200 square feet for a dwelling
not having an attached garage. In reversing the lower court, which held
such regulations were unreasonable and arbitrary, the supreme court
held they were reasonable and valid. The court was impressed with
the defendant's witness, a public health expert who testified to the
direct relation between the mental and emotional health of its oc-
cupants and the minima established by the ordinance for footage to be
adhered to. The court based its decision primarily upon considerations
of public health coupled with an acknowledgement of preserving
property values:
But quite apart from these considerations of public health
which cannot be overlooked, minimum floor-area standards are
justified on the ground that they promote the general welfare
of the community .... The size of the dwellings in any community
109. Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
110. Burroughs Landscape Constr. Co. v. Oyster Bay, 186 Misc. 930, 934, 61 N.Y.S.2d
123, 126 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
111. 1 R. ANDERSON, AmERICAN LAW OF ZONING 532 (1968).
112. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1952).
113. Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom? In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986
(1954); Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1051 (1953); Nolan & Borack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space
Requirements, 67 HAIv. L. REv. 967 (1954).
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inevitably affects the character of the community and does much
to determine whether or not it is a desirable place in which to
live."14
The concurring opinion was premised upon aesthetic considerations
which were held to be a considerable influence among the factors
entering into the legislation. 115 The ordinance was deemed, quite
simply, to preserve the acknowledged residential character of the entire
community. The concurring opinion asserted that regulations based
on aesthetic grounds are within the ambit of the police power if they
promote the interests of the public through resultant community de-
velopment and profit. They must also outweigh the incidental restraint
upon private ownership. A contrast between the majority and con-
curring opinions illustrates the interplay between aesthetics and prop-
erty values. The majority alludes to considerations of property values
under the term "character of the community" while the concurring
opinion employs direct aesthetic considerations with which to deal.
Such an example suggests that courts will manipulate the factor of
property values to uphold an ordinance actually based on subtle
aesthetic considerations.
The dissent 16 based its opinion upon the result of economic segre-
gation and equal protection:
A zoning provision that can produce this effect certainly runs afoul
of the fundamental principles of our form of government. It places
an unnecessary and severe restriction upon the alienation of real
estate .... Certain well-behaved families will be barred from these
communities, not because of any acts they do or conditions they
create, but simply because of the income of the family will not
permit them to build a house at the cost testified to in this case.
They will be relegated to living in the large cities or in multiple-
family dwellings even though it be against what they consider the
welfare of their immediate families.1 17
In evaluating Lionshead, Haar 18 stated that the ordinance was not
really formulated to promote public health, safety or even aesthetics,
but was simply "designed to do indirectly what those courts which
114. 10 N.J. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 176, 89 A.2d at 698.
116. Id. at 181, 89 A.2d at 701.
117. Id. at 181-82, 89 A.2d at 701. See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Snob Zoning-A
Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV.
507 (1964).
118. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952).
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have passed on the question have held cannot be done directly in our
society." 119 In other words, through public action, it is improper to
allow one group of citizens to exclude a class of residents by enforcing
regulations containing structural size provisions. "Casting an ordinance
in terms of minimum livable area, with no correlation to the number
of persons occupying that area, can have but one purpose: the protec-
tion of high cost buildings in the restricted area."' 20 Haar implies that
courts are simply not sophisticated enough to comprehend the essence
of such problems as posited by the case in point, especially where there
are complex economic ramifications. Courts, he states, are simply
content to stop the analysis if they can justify the ordinance on some
traditional zoning objective, however tenuous.
Other cases of this period contributed to the recognition that prop-
erty values were a factor worthy of consideration in addition to121 or
in the absence of aesthetics. 22 The 1963 Stover decision was based
primarily on aesthetic considerations; but it also relied on the con-
servation of values. Thereafter, courts more openly focused their at-
tention on the extent to which property values may be diminished
through the application of zoning regulations. In articulating the
relationship between aesthetics and property values, some displayed a
shrewdly compromising honesty in their manipulation of the degree
to which the regulation was slanted toward aesthetics, rather than
conservation of property values.123 There were, conversely, courts that
realized the central connection between the two factors. 24
An examination of recent cases is helpful to substantiate the inter-
relationship of aesthetics and property values. These cases dramatically
prophesy that aesthetics will be a valid force in zoning cases, but only
when connected with the stabilization of property values with regard
to the myriad possibilities of land utilization. Certain cases pinpoint
119. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HAv. L.
REV. 1051, 1062 (1953).
120. Id.
121. Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950); Pierro
v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A.2d 401 (1955).
122. Rockingham Hotel Co. v. North Hampton, 101 N.H. 441, 146 A.2d 253 (1958);
Presnell v. Leslie, 3 N.Y.2d 384, 144 N.E.2d 381, 165 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1957); State ex rel.
Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
123. See Note, The Administration of Zoning Flexibility Devices: An Explanation for
Recent Judicial Frustration, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 973 (1965). See generally 27 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 303 (1970).
124. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447,
449 (1964).
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the association of aesthetics and property values and acknowledge their
validity as joint factors.1 2 5
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of Minnetonka,'126
this relationship is made clear. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
reasonable the length of an amortization period within which pre-
existing nonconforming billboards were required to be removed from
residential districts. The court acknowledged the role that planning
and zoning play in municipal efforts to guide the future development
of land to insure pleasanter and more prosperous environments in
which its residents may live and work. The court noted that a growing
number of courts were becoming more receptive to aesthetics "on
the ground that the pleasant appearance of a district or community
has a direct and beneficial effect on property values and on the well-
being of its residents, and thus inevitably promote the general
welfare.' ' 127 In recognizing that residential zoning enhances property
values, thereby gradually increasing the tax base of the village, the
court remarked:
Obviously, aesthetics play a significant part in residential zoning.
But such considerations of taste and beauty more likely reflect a
community-wide opinion of what is necessary to advance and
stabilize neighborhood values rather than the purely subjective
opinions of members of the council. Thus, while, aesthetics ad-
mittedly were a significant factor in the council's decision, they
were not the sole basis.1 28
The court upheld the regulation on the basis of aesthetics and property
values even where the public health, safety, and morals were clearly
not endangered. 12 9
In a case employing similar logic, Deim eke v. State Highway
Commission, 30 the Supreme Court of Missouri held valid a statute
which provided for the screening of nonconforming junkyards adjacent
to highways at the expense of the State Highway Commission. The
statute also provided for condemnation of such property if adequate
screening was not feasible. The court recognized that there was no
125. Melton v. City of San Pablo, 252 Cal. App. 2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1967); Metro-
media, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270, 30 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1963); Piscitelli
v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (Super. Ct. 1968).
126. 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
127. Id. at 499, 162 N.W.2d at 212.
128. Id. at 500, 162 N.W.2d at 212-13.
129. Id. at 500, 162 N.W.2d at 213; see Board of Supervisors v. Miller, 170 N.W.2d 358
(Iowa 1969).
130. 444 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1969).
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contention asserted in this case that the regulation was for the pro-
motion of the public health, safety, or morals. After reviewing the
history of aesthetics in Missouri, the supreme court referred to the
Stover decision and deduced that the appearance of property also
affects not only its own value but also that of the surrounding prop-
erty.1 1 The court concluded that the regulatory measure in question,
while not based on traditional zoning objectives, was nevertheless valid
because the "general welfare" suffered due to the combined loss of
aesthetic and property values. The same court, one year later, held
that the denial of a permit for a modernistic residence in an area in
which homes of traditional Colonial, French Provincial and English
Tudor styles predominated was not arbitrary or unreasonable if the
central purpose to be served was the furtherance of the general welfare
of the community.18 2 The court stated that the forceful argument that
aesthetics was the sole factor for the enactment was not so: "Along with
that inherent factor is the effect that the proposed residence would have
upon property values in the area."''83
In the area of mobilehomes and trailers, 34 considerations of prop-
erty values and aesthetics have been traditionally obscured by justi-
fications based upon the public health, safety, and morals.135 Some
cases, however, illustrate the focus of the two factors as additions to
the standard objectives. The Supreme Court of New Jersey3 6 has been
cognizant of two of the basic concepts of zoning-encouragement of
the most appropriate use of land and the conservation of property
values-may be undermined by the indiscriminate location of trailers
within a municipality. One court has noted that "from the point of
view of aesthetic considerations (which are inextricably intertwined
with conservation of the value of property), trailers may mar the land-
scape.' 87 Some cases in this area have dealt with the perspective of
rapid growth of particular townships and have held that there is a
131. Id. at 484.
132. State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970).
133. Id. at 310.
134. See generally Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL
L.Q. 491 (1970); Comment, Regulation and Taxation of House Trailers, 22 U. CHI. L. Rav.
738 (1955); Note, Regulation of Mobile Homes, 13 SYRAcusE L. REv. 125 (1961).
135. See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 232 (1964).
136. See Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14
RuTcERs L. Rav. 37 (1960).
137. Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 494, 150 A.2d 481, 487
(1959). See also Coming v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct.
1953); People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Wash. Cty. Ct. 1965); Craver
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 40, 147 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
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reasonable basis for township officials to conclude that there existed a
long-range potential for residential development which could con-
ceivably be stunted by the uncontrolled presence of trailers in resi-
dential districts.18 Recent cases dealing with problems of mobilehomes
and trailers adhere to the more traditional zoning objectives without
having to reach the plateau of aesthetics-property values association.18 9
Most importantly, the combination of factors is often unlimited and
each case must finally be decided on the peculiar factual setting viewed
in its proper perspective. 40
In contrast to the recent decisions in which the connection between
aesthetics and property values was clearly delineated by courts, there
have been decisions in which the relationship has lacked precision.
In those cases the courts were influenced by aesthetic considerations,
however, they did not clearly identify that factor with precise language.
In Frankel v. C. Burwell, Inc.,41 the New Jersey Superior Court
held invalid a variance granted to an owner of land in a residential
zone to erect an office building when the owner changed the plans
of the building. The court stated the board of adjustment, in rec-
ommending a variance, is concerned primarily with the welfare of
the entire community, and such concern may involve consideration
of a variety of factors other than mere dimensions and the location of
the particular building in dispute. The court noted that the public
interest may require a determination of whether the appearance of the
proposed building was compatible with the neighborhood aesthetics.
The court never discussed aesthetics in relation to property values, nor
how the change in plans affected the property values of the location.
The court, furthermore, offered no explanation of what was meant
by the term "neighborhood aesthetics."
One court held that it is a fundamental theory of a zoning scheme
that it is for the general good, "to secure reasonable neighborhood
uniformity, and to exclude structures and occupations which clash
therewith . . . . The expansion of a nonconforming use offends the
spirit of zoning regulation."'142 In holding that a zoning board did not
138. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
139. State v. Larsen, 195 N.W.2d 180 (Minn. 1972); Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C.
439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970).
140. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1971)
(traffic patterns were valid local interests of greater concern than aesthetics or economic
uniformity being fostered); see Town of New Boston v. Coombs, 284 A.2d 920 (N.H. 1971).
141. 94 N.J. Super. 53, 226 A.2d 748 (Super. Ct. 1967).




have the power to permit the extension of a nonconforming use, the
court did not clarify the role that aesthetics or property values played
in the decision. The language was suggestive as to the real reasons
underlying the decision.
In Damick v. Planning & Zoning Commission,'143 the defendant re-
zoned from residential to industrial an eighteen and one-half acre
tract located in the middle of a large residential zone. The primary
reason for the change was to enable a nonconforming manufac-
turer to expand its plant building that occupied a very small portion
of the tract. Although the change fostered the interest of the manu-
facturing concern, it clearly violated the well-established zoning regu-
lations, was detrimental to the owners of residences in the area, and
had all the vices illustrative of spot zoning. The trial court concluded
that the change was not in accordance with the applicable compre-
hensive plan and that the action of the Commission was improper.
While noting that an essential purpose of zoning regulations was the
stabilization of "property use," the court stated that changes in zone
should not be effectuated "unless some new condition has arisen which
substantially alters the character of the area.- 144 The court neither
considered the standards by which such an examination could be made,
nor clarified what was meant by the usage of the phrase "character of
the area."'145
In analyzing cases which interrelate property values and aesthetics,
certain factors emerge which necessitate a thorough examination. The
aesthetic development of the neighborhood, zoning and the use of
properties either adjoining or nearby, the suitability of property for
certain uses and restrictions thereby imposed, the extent to which
renewal of the restriction will detrimentally affect adjoining or nearby
property, the length of time since structures of the type permitted by
the restriction have been built, and the basic balance drawn between
the general welfare and the rights of the private owner in accordance
with a given comprehensive zoning plan are important factors. What-
ever the use, it is becoming clear that land-use controls which deal with
143. 158 Conn. 78, 256 A.2d 428 (1969).
144. Id. at 84, 256 A.2d at 431.
145. A similar problem is raised in correlating "maintaining and preserving the
character of a particular area" to "significant economic injury." See Fulling v. Palumbo,
21 N.Y.2d 30, 233 N.E.2d 272, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1967); Rowe Street Associates, Inc. v.
Town of Oyster Bay, 63 Misc. 2d 46, 310 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup. Ct. 1969); cf. Gougeon v.
Board of Adjustment, 52 N.J. 212, 245 A.2d 7 (1968) ("physically harmonious growth of
land use in municipality").
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these enumerated factors, are applied recognizing the interplay of
aesthetics and property values.
AESTHETICS: THE PENNSYLVANIA CASES
In Pennsylvania the development of aesthetics in zoning has been
incongruous with that of most American jurisdictions. At the turn
of the twentieth century, the Pennsylvania courts viewed aesthetics,
either expressly 148 or impliedly147 with scorn and disenchantment.
In doing so they followed the national normative standard. However,
after aesthetics reached the judicially acknowledged status of an aux-
iliary component in zoning enactments, the concept rarely achieved
any consistency. There are reasons for this, but it would be best, first,
to examine the reception aesthetics received in Pennsylvania from that
earlier period through mid-century.
The police power could be utilized, as in most other jurisdictions,
for the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. The supreme
court noted, "The exercise must have a substantial relation to the
public good within the spheres held proper. It must not be from an
arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic laws or for
purely aesthetic considerations.' u 48 One early case illustrates how
courts avoided aesthetic considerations and based their opinions on
traditional police power objectives. In Gilfillan's Permit,49 the court
stated that a permit for the construction of a cement warehouse to
take the place of an open lumber yard would greatly diminish the fire
risk and would help promote the public health, safety, and morals. In
holding that the proposed construction would not detrimentally alter
the character of the neighborhood, the court furnished a list of guide-
lines among which was that "the building would not be detrimental to
the neighborhood, but, on the contrary, render it more safe, clean and
attractive in appearance."' The court only alluded to the aesthetic
embetterment of the neighborhood that would result from a change
in the kind of building to be erected; it did not treat the aesthetic
factor as it did other more traditional ones.
146. Bryan v. Chester, 212 Pa. 259, 262, 61 A. 894, 895 (1905); Pittsburgh Poster
Advertising Co. v. Swissdale Borough, 70 Pa. Super. 224, 227 (1918).
147. Jenning's Appeal, 330 Pa. 154, 198 A. 621 (1938); Brosnan's Appeal, 330 Pa. 161,
198 A. 629 (1938); Ward's Appeal, 289 Pa. 458, 137 A. 630 (1927); Junge's Appeal, 89 Pa.
Super. 548 (1926).
148. White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 266, 134 A. 409, 412 (1926).
149. 291 Pa. 358, 140 A. 136 (1927).
150. Id. at 361, 140 A. at 137.
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In Miller v. Seaman,15' the court held that an owner of a lot, con-
taining the minimum area required by city zoning regulations, may
erect a one-story frame dwelling even if not in aesthetic harmony with
buildings on adjoining lots. The court stated:
The limitation of the right to use one's own property, which is one
of the consequences of zoning regulations, must be reasonable and
based on imperious considerations of public health, morals and
safety, not on artistic or aesthetic considerations. 15 2
Parelleling such earlier decisions through the mid-century was a
severely scattered cluster of cases that provided more liberal alterna-
tives to the status of aesthetics. In a case dealing with regulation of
advertising signs in a residential area, the supreme court, in 1927, stated
that while zoning legislation may not rest entirely upon aesthetic con-
siderations, the incidental consideration of a question of aesthetics
will not invalidate the exercise of the police power. 158 One year later,
the supreme court analyzed the validity of a zoning ordinance that
issued set-back regulations in strictly residential areas. 15 4 The court
stated that the presence of an aesthetic objective among other justifica-
tions may be considered in connection with the general welfare. The
supreme court, however, did not define or discuss what it meant by the
term "general welfare," nor had it previously done so.
Two other cases-both dealing with aesthetics in relation to the
public at large-proclaimed their support for the aesthetic ethic. In
Walnut & Quince Streets Corp. v. Mills,15 the supreme court added:
It is true that recognition of the power to regulate aesthetics is of
comparatively recent mention in the law books in this country, but
it would be an unwarranted repudiation of much that has been
accomplished toward the beautification of our towns and cities by
state and municipal effort, exercised principally, and rightfully,
under the police power, to hold, at this date, that our fundamental
law does not permit state and municipal control over aesthetic con-
siderations in the regulation of public property. 5 6
In Commonwealth v. Trimmer,57 the court held the police power
authorized an ordinance regulating the display of advertisements in a
151. 137 Pa. Super. 24, 8 A.2d 415 (1939).
152. Id. at 31, 24 A.2d at 417.
153. Appeal of Liggett, 291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927).
154. Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 A. 81 (1928).
155. 303 Pa. 25, 154 A. 29 (1931).
156. Id. at 34, 154 A. at 32.
157. 53 Dauph. County R. 91 (Pa. 1942).
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predominately residential area. It was to the interest of the city as a
whole, the court stated, that the dignity and beauty of the area should
be maintained. Traffic hazards and nuisances within the area would
also be prohibited. The defendant was convicted of having attached
two large illuminated signs above the sidewalk. The light projected ap-
proximately six feet within the line of the street. The appeal was dis-
missed, and the ordinance was upheld on aesthetic grounds coupled with
reasons of public safety. The court stated: "The question immediately
before us illustrates how legal principles are and must sometimes be
changed to conform to the changing manner of living."'158 The court
then held that aesthetic considerations alone could justify the exercise
of the police power. Of the six cases cited in the opinion, five were
wrongly interpreted by the Trimmer court by misconstruing the status
of aesthetics as implied by the cited decisions. What the Trimmer court
clearly failed to do-which, at least, five of the six cases did do-was
to clarify what was meant by the term "general welfare." This would
have been a difficult undertaking for the court since prior Pennsylvania
cases dealing with the police power and zoning had not defined the
term in any depth.
After 1950 a multitude of cases emerged in which the courts, in
focusing on the aesthetic consideration, limited themselves to a pro-
nunciation of the traditional aesthetics rule.159 In Appeal of Lord,6 0
the supreme court held that a home owner could not be deprived of
a right to use his own property as he so wished merely because a zoning
board believed that what he intended to erect was not aesthetic or artis-
tic.' 6 ' The question before the court in Commonwealth v. Flannery162
was whether a house trailer which was placed on cinder-blocks and
connected to the municipal water lines, sewage systems, and power
lines was a dwelling within the purview of a zoning ordinance.'6
Finding the house trailer to be within the contemplation of the ordi-
nance, the court stated:
158. Id. at 97.
159. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); HA. Steen Indus., Inc. v.
Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); National Land Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965); Landis v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 146, 198 A.2d 574 (1964); Rogalski
v. Township of Upper Chichester, 406 Pa. 550, 178 A.2d 712 (1962).
160. 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951).
161. Id. at 128, 81 A.2d at 536.
162. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 680 (C.P. Cumber. Co. 1954).
163. See Eshelman, Municipal Regulation of House Trailers in Pennsylvania, 66 DicK.
L. Ra-v. 301 (1962).
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Although the location of this trailer on a lot in an area where there
are only permanently constructed -homes may not harmonize or be
in aesthetic agreement with the other buildings, the health, morals
and safety of the community are not affected thereby. Its location
thereon may not, therefore, be prohibited.16 4
In 1954, the supreme court decided Appeal of Medinger,165 a case
which held invalid an ordinance which zoned a residential area for a
minimum floor space requirement of 1800 square feet. The court
granted the petitioner the right to construct a home with a floor space
containing only 1125 square feet. Finding no sufficient justification on
the grounds of public health, safety or morals,"' the court then in-
quired whether the ordinance could be sustained as promoting the
general welfare. It held that:
. . . neither aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property
values or the stabilization of economic values in a township are,
singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the morals
or the safety or the general welfare of the township or its inhabi-
tants or property owners.. .. 167
This statement has since retained an extraordinary vitality in the Penn-
sylvania courts.
In a case decided the same year as Medinger, the supreme court
stated that the spirit of zoning regulations is limited to a consideration
of public health, safety, and general welfare.16 8 No other considerations
should enter into the decisions. 169 The court did not explain what it
meant by the term "general welfare."
Cases after Medinger that dealt with aesthetic ramifications in zoning
not only followed its reasoning, 70 but also continued to evaluate aes-
thetics in a vacuum. Courts acknowledged aesthetics in its traditional
role and, for the most part, would not even extend the discussion of
164. 1 Pa. D. & C.2d at 683; accord, Commonwealth v. DePriest, 77 Montg. County
L. Rptr. 11 (Pa. 1959).
165. 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
166. See American Veterans Housing Cooperative, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
69 Pa. D. & C. 449 (C.P. Montg. Co. 1949).
167. 377 Pa. at 226, 104 A.2d at 122.
168. Pincus v. Power, 376 Pa. 175, 101 A.2d 914 (1954).
169. Id. at 180, 101 A.2d at 916.
170. H.A. Steen Indus., Inc. v. Cavanaugh, 430 Pa. 10, 241 A.2d 771 (1968); ExtonQuarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Fellowship
Ambulance Club's Appeal, 406 Pa. 465, 178 A.2d 578 (1962); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal,
389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587 (1957); Pymatuning Township Zoning Ordinance, Appeal of
Hamm, 52 Pa. D. & C.2d 187 (C.P. Mercer Co. 1971).
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aesthetics to include the possibility of its being an auxiliary component
of a regulation. a7 1
If before 1950 aesthetics as an auxiliary factor had a brief develop-
ment, its appearance after mid-century was even less noticeable. In
1953, one court stated: "Public welfare is more than a phrase and
above aesthetics . . . though it may be found that 'the key to a science
of values will be found in aesthetics.' -172 Two years later, while ac-
knowledging the traditional rule and the overwhelming force of deci-
sions in Pennsylvania against aesthetic considerations, the court none-
theless proceeded to note the auxiliary development of aesthetics in
other jurisdictions and upheld an ordinance that subjected to the
approval of a municipal art commission the design, construction, erec-
tion, and maintenance of signs in the area bordering historic Philadel-
phia sites. 173
The year 1958 witnessed a sudden eruption of the aesthetic ethic in
the supreme court decisions of Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment 74
and Bilbar Construction Co. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment."5 In
Best, the supreme court noted that in determining the constitutionality
of zoning ordinances, community attractiveness and property values
are proper elements of the general welfare. 7 In Bilbar Construction Co.,
the court noted that although some recent cases ignored the "general
welfare" term in considering the police power, it was still one of the
important factors to be analyzed in any such inquiry. "Its importance
lies partly in the fact that it admits of aesthetic considerations when
passing upon the validity of a zoning ordinance.' 7 7 In citing Appeal
of Kerr,178 the court stated that aesthetics may be considered in con-
nection with questions of general welfare. 79 The court concluded:
171. Cf. cases cited notes 159 & 170 supra. See also the following recent cases which
deal with "blanket" prohibitions and burden of proof problems. These cases themselves
adhere, by implication, to the traditional rule disdaining aesthetics: Beaver Gasoline Co.
v. Zoning Bd., 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971); Derry Borough v. Shomo, 5 Pa. Comm.
Ct. 216, 289 A.2d 513 (1972); Daikeler v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 1 Pa. Comm. Ct.
445, 275 A.2d 696 (1971).
172. Dobison v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 87 Pa. D. 8c C. 172, 174 (C.P. Phila. Co 1953).
173. Levin v. Philadelphia, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 272 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1955).
174. 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958).
175. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
176. 393 Pa. at 117, 141 A.2d at 612; see Paxtang Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Brady,
73 Dauph. County R. 98 (Pa. 1958) (relied on Best in holding that aesthetic considerations
have a direct relation to the general welfare).
177. 393 Pa. at 72, 141 A.2d at 856-57.
178. Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 A. 81 (1928).
179. 393 Pa. at 72, 141 A.2d at 857.
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Since, with the passing of time, urban and suburban planning has
become an accredited adjunct of municipal government, aesthetic
considerations have progressively become more and more persua-
sive as sustaining reasons for the exercise of the police power. i80
These cases must not pass unnoticed because they illustrate the com-
plex problem that Pennsylvania courts have traditionally avoided:
namely, what is meant by the term "general welfare," and furthermore,
what is the relationship between aesthetics and "general welfare." Vir-
tually nowhere in the Pennsylvania decisions have the courts clearly
explained what is meant by the term "general welfare." While the
court in Appeal of Kerr tersely mentioned the term, it did not explain
it. This point is crucial because it pinpoints where Pennsylvania, at a
very early stage, divorced itself from the majority of jurisdictions that
eventually recognized aesthetics as a valid auxiliary component of
zoning legislation. Other state courts attempted to come to grips with
the term "general welfare," and often furnished dicta that provided a
detailed chronological development of judicial recognition of the term.
However, the Pennsylvania courts barely touched on the term; neither
its meaning nor its essence were discussed. While other state courts
broadened their interpretation of "general welfare" in response to an
acknowledgement of more sophisticated societal needs, Pennsylvania
decisions remained relatively static. It therefore came as no surprise
when, in Medinger, Justice Bell had mentioned:
These broad general words which are difficult to define must be
construed in connection with their statutory context as well as
with and subordinate to the individual and property rights which
are guaranteed by the Constitution.'"
Four years after Bilbar, in Key Realty Co. Zoning Case,82 Chief Jus-
tice Bell, in his concurring opinion of substantial impact, attacked the
status of Pennsylvania zoning as it then existed. is The decision ne-
gated any validity of aesthetics which may have been derived from
either the Best or Bilbar decisions. The Chief Justice provided the
clue to Pennsylvania statutory interpretation of the traditional "public
health, safety, morals and general welfare" clause when he stated
that the words "general welfare" were ejusdem generis with health,
180. Id.
181. 377 Pa. at 255, 104 A.2d at 122.
182. 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962).
183. Id. at 102-21, 182 A.2d at 190-99.
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safety, and morals. 84 Such an approach prevents aesthetics from
achieving its rightful status in Pennsylvania. The Chief Justice con-
cluded with a remark which retarded any further consideration of
aesthetics by the supreme court:
I would hold (a) that aesthetic values are not a factor in the con-
sideration of the validity or constitutionality of a zoning Act or
ordinance, and (b) that "general welfare" alone is not sufficient to
validate or constitutionalize a zoning Act or ordinance or regula-
tion. To this extent, I would disapprove Bilbar and Best.8 5
Since Chief Justice Bell's comments in 1962, considerations of aes-
thetics have virtually disappeared from Pennsylvania decisions. 86
Where they are mentioned, they are referred to only in a few sen-
tences.' 87
It is interesting to note that where aesthetic factors have been sub-
stantial considerations in cases during the last two decades, Pennsyl-
vania courts have managed to shift the focus to property values, the
obscured coordinate of aesthetics. The difficulty with Chief Justice
Bell's remarks can be analyzed. His blanket prohibition of aesthetics
means property values, which have gradually emerged as a considera-
tion for zoning enactments, 88 cannot be interrelated with aesthetics to
be part of general welfare. Depending on the severity of Bell's remarks
regarding the "general welfare," such coupling of aesthetics and prop-
erty values might not matter. This is unfortunate in that Pennsylvania
cases are so similar to those in other jurisdictions where aesthetic factors
are deemed auxiliary considerations which are linked with property
values. It should also be noted that not only has aesthetics never been
184. Id. at 112, 182 A.2d at 194.
185. Id. at 119, 182 A.2d at 198.
186. But see Harrison v. Upper Merion Township Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 45 Pa.
D. & C.2d 452, 457 (C.P. Montg. Co. 1968); Johnstown Advertising Co. v. Portage Borough,
27 Pa. D. & C.2d 617 (C.P. Cambria Co. 1962). The court, while acknowledging the Med-
inger holding, nonetheless stated: "Despite the fact that this quotation has been cited with
approval . . . we conclude that aesthetics may and the preservation of property values
does come within the proper objectives of zoning." Id. at 625.
187. Cases cited note 159 supra.
188. Cases prior to Chief Justice Bell's comments recognized property values as an
incident of zoning laws. Phillips v. Griffith, 366 Pa. 468, 77 A.2d 375 (1951); Shoemaker
v. York Jr. College, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 750 (C.P. York Co. 1963); Steppler v. Board of
Adjustment, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 8 (C.P. Del. Co. 1955). The Pennsylvania courts have ex-
pressed a concern for discerning how property values are affected in zoning confficts. The
validity of the testimony of real estate experts is often the determinative factor in the case.
Pymatuning Township Zoning Ordinance, Appeal of Hamm, 52 Pa. D. & C.2d 187, 189
(C.P. Mercer Co. 1971); see Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. New Britain Borough
Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Comm. Ct. 594, 600, 290 A.2d 719, 722 (1972); Appeal of Groff,
1 Pa. Comm. Ct. 439, 443, 274 A.2d 574, 575-76 (1971); Van Gerbig v. Marshall, 36 Pa.
D. & C.2d 133, 141 (C.P. Chester Co. 1965).
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properly considered an auxiliary factor in defining "general welfare,"
but courts have not even discerned their importance on an ad hoc
basis. And now, when Pennsylvania courts attempt to examine the
fundamental complexities of property values and try to implement
them as a factor to substantiate the general welfare, they will be con-
fronted with the difficult task of correlating property values with public
health, safety, and morals rather than with the pariah, aesthetics.
CONCLUSION
Almost ten years have passed since the Stover decision, almost five
since Ferrier. These New York cases held that aesthetics alone may war-
rant an exercise of the police power. The first decision was tempered
by hazy underlying considerations of property values; the second was
couched in a complete appreciation of the aesthetic ethic divorced from
any other factor which might have been influential. What is most sig-
nificant about the Stover decision is its allusion to property values. So
few jurisdictions have made an unequivocable endorsement of aesthet-
ics, as in Ferrier, that it is apparent that aesthetics, in order to substan-
tiate an exercise of the police power through the "general welfare,"
must be coupled with some other factor. In other words, the auxiliary
theory of aesthetics remains prominent, and it is highly improbable
that the New York view as derived from Ferrier will ever become a
majority standard for aesthetics. As an auxiliary factor, aesthetics will
have to rely on some other dominant consideration with which it will
have to form a partnership to enhance the "general welfare" term of
the traditional zoning analysis. Aesthetics would be best suited for an
association with property values. The correlation of property values
with aesthetics would furnish the courts with an objective guideline to
determine the extent to which aesthetically-motivated legislation truly
advances the general welfare.
Of course, aesthetics can be the sole basis on which to base the exer-
cise of the police power in situations where it would be extraordinarily
foolish to do otherwise. Even then, however, there is the attachment of
property values as a subordinate consideration which would also be
reasonable to assert. Courts will refrain from basing their decisions on
a purely aesthetic viewpoint.
Zoning regulations for the promotion of the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare are made with reasonable consideration for
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certain factors derived from legislative standards: for example, the par-
ticular district in question, its suitability for particular uses, and the
assurance of developing a future environment which realizes the great-
est possible use and enjoyment of land with respectful considerations
for adjoining properties. Such factors combine not only to promote but
also to protect the general welfare through the regulation of land-use
control for the benefits of an intelligently planned development. Given
these standards, it is remarkable aesthetics has not yet been accorded a
status worthy of those traditional objectives which alone will sustain an
exercise of the police power. It is more remarkable that it should have
taken so long for aesthetics to garner the elementary respect it has
achieved in the last quarter century.
ROBERT S. PEARLSTEIN
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